Abstract
I. Introduction In 1991, the Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 1 that an employee's agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes may require arbitration of statutory claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 2 Although the Supreme Court in Gilmer determined that a person "may agree to arbitrate statutory claims," this does not mean "that an employer has a free hand in requiring compulsory arbitration as a condition of employment." 3 Compulsory arbitration differs from a system under which an employee voluntarily agrees to submit a claim to arbitration after the dispute arose. 4 In fact, the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourages this form of alternative dispute resolution for a discrimination claim. 5 In contrast, compulsory arbitration requires an employee, as a condition of employment, to forego all access to a jury trial and use arbitration in place of a judicial forum for resolving statutory and contractual claims. For purposes of this Article, compulsory arbitration is narrowly defined to identify a situation where an employer requires an individual, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement waiving the right to litigate future claims in a judicial forum in exchange for initial employment, or the opportunity to continue current employment. 6 As defined, this Article addresses whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes the compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. Although numerous commentators have addressed the general issue of compulsory arbitration of employment disputes, 7