Abstract
This thesis is part of a National Science Foundation (NSF) project focused on securing power grids against data injection attacks. Power grids are undergoing their largest technological transformation since their invention. Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) adopt several advanced components and the Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) is considered the most important one in them. In a power grid, PMUs are used to obtain measurements of the system and report them to the control center with a time-stamp for real-time monitoring and analysis. PMUs in North America utilizes GPS (Global Positioning System) to get a precise to allow operators a wide area snapshot of power grids and therefore enhance the reliability of the system. However, PMUs may be susceptible to cyber-attacks as well. This thesis surveys the vulnerabilities that can affect the operation of power grids through PMUs and develops a fault tree of studied vulnerabilities.
In addition, this thesis evaluates threats associated withWAMS that can affect the proper functioning of WAMS. A taxonomy of threats in WAMS is developed using both an impact-oriented and a threat-oriented approach, considering both benign and malicious faults. The taxonomy of WAMS threats is based on an abstract WAMS model with PMUs as sensor units and PDCs (Phasor Data Concentrators) and Super PDCs as correlation units. A qualitative assessment scale is used to describe associated impact for the threat sources.