Abstract
The study of HVDC systems and cyber-attacks on their control systems can play an important role
in the security and stability of large interconnected power systems. This work develops and analyzes a
layer of security useful to detect and mitigate the negative impact of cyber-attacks directed towards high
voltage direct current (HVDC) systems. It also identifies and categorizes potential attack types which
may be harmful to power system operation if left unmitigated. Minimization of transients induced by
remediation action are also addressed through the use of a classic control system technique: the bumpless
transfer. Contained in this thesis is a summary of the testing performed on a HVDC cyber physical
simulation environment, the performance of the security algorithms in terms of timing, detection rate,
and relationship with false detection. Successful implementation of the approaches developed in this
thesis can help allow the HVDC system to enhance resilience of the interconnected power system in the
face of cyber-attacks.