Abstract
Johnson builds on the idea that agents, at least sometimes, have an epistemic obligation to voice disagreements. Any of four background theories, inspired by influential work in social epistemology, can generate these obligations. However, each background theory generates obligations with different characteristics. Johnson explores these differences by looking at the extent and limits of each. Key questions include the conditions under which agents should voice their disagreement, and to what extent that disagreement must be sincere. One way of asking this second question is to ask, to what extent are we epistemically obligated to play devil’s advocate?
This chapter starts with a brief discussion of devil's advocacy. Next, it discusses the differences between playing devil's advocacy and arguing for or defending one's own sincere beliefs. After this, the chapter argues that belief in any of four epistemic theories should motivate belief in an epistemic obligation to voice disagreement: the Frickerian theory; Elginian theory; Gilbertian theory; and Millian background theory. The first theory involves epistemic justice and other intellectual virtues, the second is based on the norms of inquiry, the third rests on joint commitment to epistemic ends, and the fourth relies on the nature of justification itself. Next, the chapter sketches each of these background theories and the manner in which each generates an obligation to voice disagreement. Finally, it examines each one using the key questions that include the conditions under which agents should voice their disagreement, and to what extent that disagreement must be sincere.